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Between Sovereigns:
A Reexamination of
the Refugee's Status
Stephen B. Young*

INTRODUCTION
A refugee leaves the country of his or her national origin because the
political community will not or can no longer vouchsafe the refugee's life,
liberty, or peace of mind. In many cases, the sovereign of national origin
actively and coercively deprives the refugee of those basic components of
human dignity. By taking flight, refugees enter a precarious realm between
sovereigns. They may no longer rely upon the solicitude of their native
sovereign, yet international law gives them no effective replacement for
that power. They gain neither a right to asylum in other countries nor one
to the assumption of a new nationality. Yet only the tie of nationality
furnishes the full protection of international law, since individuals as such
have no rights under that body of law. Covenants on the status of refugees
and stateless persons and the organization of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have not changed this aspect of the
world order.
Another field of international law-that of international human rights
-provides at least a complement to, and perhaps even a replacement for,
international refugee law. Norms defining international human rights constrain governments in their treatment of individuals, be they citizens,
foreign nationals, or stateless migrants. Thus, as limitations on the power
of sovereigns to abuse individuals are given greater recognition, the refugee's loss of nationality, so detrimental to his or her fate under older
approaches to international law, becomes of lesser consequence. The application of human rights norms to refugee situations should minimize the
failures of government that provoke refugee movements, provide adequate
succor for refugees once they arrive in a new jurisdiction, and allow the
* Research Associate, East Asian Legal Studies, Harvard Law School; Member, Citizens
Commission on Indochinese Refugees.
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application of sanctions against those states which generate refugees. This
article, which advocates the application of human rights standards to refugees, and describes the salutary effects of such a development, is more an
exploration of policies and principles implicit in international law than a
discussion of explicit rules binding on states.

INDIVIDUALS AND NATIONALITY
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
As persons in flight, refugees take themselves beyond the pale of protection offered by their original sovereign to its own nationals. Often a change
of government precipitates a refugee exodus, as certain inhabitants of a
national territory despair of receiving that solicitude for life, liberty, and
personal advantage which is the aspiration of most people and is the due
of every citizen living under a government that acknowledges the rule of
law. 1 Refugees leave the jurisdiction most responsible for their welfare
and, as stateless individuals, enter the territory of a foreign sovereign.
Under international law, therefore, refugees and other stateless persons
have no effective bond to any sovereign political community which is
recognized under the law of nations. 2 They can only be considered in their
capacity as individuals, not as nationals.
To be sure, as a matter of legal literalism refugees may still be nationals
of the sovereignty from which they have fled. 3 Such a construction of their
status, however, is misleading. Their prior sovereign usually has little
interest in promoting their felicity and may only wish them ill. They
themselves may harbor the desire to frustrate politically and even to sabotage with armed force the designs of that prior sovereign. The tie of nationality in legal theory is a reciprocal exchange of loyalty and political
commitment from the individual for a warrant from the collective national
authority of full and complete succor and protection. 4 When a person
becomes a refugee, the act of flight acknowledges the failure of that reciprocal relationship.
Such a definition of the status of refugee as a person at odds with his
or her nominal sovereign is made explicit by Article 1 of the Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees which defines a refugee as anyone who,
fearing persecution in his homeland, "is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country." 5 The Convention also applies to stateless
persons or those without any claim to a nationality at all when they, owing
to fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return to their country
of former habitual residence. 6
Since refugees and stateless persons stand isolated as individuals and
not as members in good standing of some political community which will
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defend their rights and privileges, their status must be addressed initially
from the perspective of the standing of individuals under international
law. While there have been those who find higher principles of humanism
in the law of nations, the practice of sovereign nation-states has confirmed
the preference of governments to appropriate unto themselves exclusively
the burdens and the benefits of international law. 7 The traditional rule is
that states are the subjects of international law and individuals only the
indirect objects of international legal rules. 8
Individuals were recognized by international law in the past only in so
far as they were nationals of a sovereign state. John Austin wrote that
every human being who has rights and duties is either a citizen or a
foreigner, that is, either a national of the domestic sovereign or of some
other sovereign. Rights, he believed, were created by the positive law of
a sovereign only for the members of the independent political community
of which the sovereign is the paramount authority. 9 Those without nationality under Austin's scheme of positive law had no rights. Mistreatment of its own nationals abroad gave to a sovereign certain rights to
secure redress from the sovereign in whose territory the mistreatment
occurred. In this way individuals found protection as the beneficiaries of
state prerogatives. Nationality was the only tie between an individual and
the succor of international law. 10
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights has modified this rule with
a norm that sovereign states have duties, corresponding to certain enumerated human rights of individuals, to persons under their territorial police
power." Exhortation being insufficient to benefit individuals, two covenants, one on civil and political rights and one on economic and social
rights, provide for voluntary obligations by states to observe new rules of
international law that make individuals subjects and not just objects of
that jurisprudence. 12 Yet today, the power of individuals successfully to
invoke remedies-the distinctive attribute of any subject of a law-for
violations of their human rights is still inconsiderable. Individuals may
have more prominence under contemporary international law than they
once had, but they are still second in importance to the prerogatives and
plenary discretions of state sovereigns. The tie of nationality is still important.
The all-important tie is not really in the hands of those who need it:
individuals do not have the power to determine their own nationality.
Under international law, the characterization of a person as a subject of this
or that state is left to the discretion of municipal laws. 13 For all his or her
anglophilia, one can never become a subject of the British Crown in the
eyes of international law unless and until such person complies with the
laws in force on naturalization in Great Britain and has some meaningful
personal tie to that territory. 14 Nationality is a descriptive label attached
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to individuals for the purpose of determining the laws and policies that
shall be of consequence for their lives. 15 The criteria used by states for
determining nationality (birthplace, parentage, or habitual domicile within
territorial boundaries agreed upon by states) are "highly artificial and
anachronistic from any functional perspective ... and ... may bear only
an accidental relation to the facts of community membership." 16
Unfortunately for the people placed by governments in different national categories, any characterization, no matter how arbitrary, is not
without its legal importance. The concept of "nationality" has often been
"reified" into a "pseudo-absolute comparable to 'title."' 17 He who is
considered to hold good title is in a favored position, as a consequence of
the legal characterization of his relationship to the thing at issue, to invoke
state power on behalf of his property ambitions. Just so, characterizations
of nationality lend advantages (or at times, in the case of conflict between
states, disadvantages) to those coming within the ambit of the defined
status. From time immemorial, citizens have been protected while deprivations have been imposed on non-nationals or aliens. In the fifteenth century, the Inquisition in Spain had deprived the Jews of their status as
lawful members of the realm and had, accordingly, expelled them. 18 Placing people beyond the law was a penal sanction in medieval England
(Robin Hood was an "out-law") 19 and the Athenians had ostracized those
citizens whose ambitions had grown beyond temperate bounds. The
American DredScoftdecision of 1857 based its denial of right to a black slave
on the grounds that slayes and their descendants could not be citizens and
that only citizens were protected by the Constitution. 20 In a world organized into states, decisions about nationality affect the access of individuals to a protector and determine the substance of their individual rights. 21
The ultimate impotence of individuals before international law surfaces
in decisions regarding citizenship. Abuse of the power to make and unmake citizens is a danger inherent in sovereignty. States categorize individuals for the advantage of the collective, and individuals have no
power to alter these decisions. Denial of nationality membership in the
collective to large groups of people has frequently marked repressive modern regimes born in revolution or driven by an ethnic concept of community. In the twentieth century, nationalist doctrines and Rousseauist notions
of the social contract as something formed in a revolution have both given
increased significance to the status of being a national. In 1921 the Soviet
Government revoked their nationality from Russians who had fled their
homeland after the October 1917 Bolshevik seizure of power and who had
not yet registered with the new authorities as citizens of the Soviet Republic. 22 The Socialist Republic of Vietnam keeps thousands of its former
opponents in re-education camps in Saigon six years after Hanoi's conquest of the Republic of Vietnam on the pretext that such people do not
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yet deserve to be its "citizens." 23 The legal basis for the system of apartheid in South Africa is a conception of citizenship. In legal contemplation,
blacks are not citizens of the republic but of various tribal homelands. To
travel and work outside of their homeland, they require documents in the
nature of an identification passport and a visa issued by the government
of the republic to persons it considers as no more than strangers sojourning
in its midst. 24
Perhaps the high point of modern citizenship denial occurred in Nazi
Germany when the citizenship of Jews was revoked by the Nuremberg law
of September 15, 1935.25 Supplemental decrees stripped the Jews of entitlements to property and then to police protection. The Final Solution was
but the logical extension of a nationality characterization imposed on
people who had thereby been denied all rights, privileges, claims, and
sufferances within the Nazi order.
In most of these situations where citizenship was denied to classes of
people, large refugee movements have occurred. With the bond of nationality broken by official ostracism, the refugees found themselves between
sovereigns in a no-man's land of international law.

THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND STATELESS PERSONS
Until modified by a signed convention and by the creation of supranational
organizations, international law provided no protection for persons, such
as refugees, for whom the tie of nationality had failed. Such persons are,
in the general sense, stateless. Prior to the Convention relating to the Status
of Stateless Persons 26 stateless persons fell into two categories: de jure
stateless persons who have no claim at all to a nationality and de facto
stateless persons who had a nationality which has become of null effect. 27
Persons might fall into the category of de jure statelessness through the
operation of nationality laws regarding, for example, the status of persons
born out of wedlock or aboard ship or else through procedures to strip
them of nationality. 28 Defacto stateless persons are most likely individuals
who for political, economic, or social reasons have ceased being members
in good standing with the authorities of their homeland but who have not
been stripped of formal status.
Whether de jure or de facto, stateless persons had no right to protection
under traditional international law. Even today they may be denied entrance to a foreign state by the territorial sovereign, although other aliens
who are nationals of some state have a claim to enter. The Hague Convention of 1930 on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality
Laws left each state free to establish its nationality laws as it wished. 29
States therefore have no obligation to provide a home for stateless persons
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in their laws. Robert Frost put the legal essence of the matter accurately
when he defined home as "the place where, when you have to go there,
they have to take you in."130 Stateless persons have no home. National
status must be deserved and nationality laws explain how it can be acquired.
In 1954, a Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons was
opened for subscription to provide a standard of treatment for de jure
stateless persons. 31 By its terms, the Convention only applies to persons
who cannot be considered a national under the laws of any nation. While
the definition of refugee turns on an individual's subjective perception of
susceptibility to persecution, the definition of a stateless person looks to
municipal laws in force, not to how individuals regard those laws. Be that
as it may, the Convention of 1954 gives de jure stateless persons a certain
status. However, under Article 3, contracting states are not prohibited from
discriminating against de jure stateless persons on the grounds of sex, social
origin, or political opinion.
The Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons provides for
rights of judicial access, livelihood, religion, and education suitable for a
reasonable life shorn of the advantages provided by participation in the
political community of the territory of residence. Most jurisdictions otherwise reserve such advantages for citizens.
Long before 1954 a special category of stateless persons had been considered to have a special claim to the solicitude of foreign sovereigns even
though they were not entitled to such favorable treatment under then
accepted rules of international law. These persons were called refugees.
That they had lost the protected status of nationals due to political persecution through no personal fault of their own was no doubt the factor
which evoked considerations of equity on their behalf. Under the League
of Nations, a "High Commissioner on behalf of the League in connection
with the problems of the Russian refugees in Europe" was appointed as
efforts were made to give those particular refugees some legal status in the
international order. 32 The problem of refugees was approached only on an
ad hoc basis as a limited, one-time problem. This was appropriate in
responding to people caught outside the normal channels of international
legal relations. Then in 1933 a High Commissioner was appointed to assist
persons fleeing Nazi Germany. 33 Conventions were also signed by various
powers granting these European refugees travel documents, permitting
them to seek asylum in alien lands, and allowing them enjoyment of
various civil rights and economic privileges. 34 World War II and the subsequent imposition of Communist rule in Eastern Europe generated their
own large refugee movements. Again, concerned governments responded
in an ad hoc manner. First they established the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), in 1943, next the International Refugee
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Organization (IRO) in 1947, and then the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1951 to assist these people in resettling
35
and in finding new nationalities.
Adopted as a resolution of the General Assembly, the Statute of the
UNHCR gives the High Commissioner the dual functions of providing
protection in the international arena for refugees and of seeking permanent
solutions for the refugee problem. But the authority of the High Commissioner embraces only persons defined as refugees in the Statute, not every
stateless person in need of help. The exception, then, to the existing rules
on international law which validate sovereign state prerogatives is only a
limited one. The statute contains a narrow conception of who is a refugee.
A particular subjective intent-fear of persecution-present in the refugee's mind at the moment of flight, distinguishes a refugee from stateless
persons in general.
The fear also has to meet an objective test: it must be
"well-founded." 3 6 With the passage of the Statute of the UNHCR, refugees gained no change in their formal status under international law (they
still had none) but could at least now look to an institution of some
consequence, if not to a territorial sovereign power, for help and assistance.
As the establishment of the UNHCR was being debated, simultaneous
consideration was given to the formulation of a new legal status for refugees under international law so that territorial sovereigns would have
some obligations towards them without regard for protective actions taken
by the High Commissioner. To accomplish this restriction of traditional
sovereign powers, a convention was opened for signature in the summer
of 1951.37 Following the ad hoc approach, the Convention did not provide
for a universal status of refugee. Only persons involved in events occurring
before January 1,1951, either in Europe or elsewhere, could hope to benefit
from the status it offered. A subsequent Protocol updated the Convention
to include within its protective umbrella persons affected by events occurring after 1951.38 Even though the Convention was restrictive in its definition of who deserved refugee protection, there was no rush of countries
to accept its obligations.
The Convention relating to the Status of Refugees created a new status
for some individuals under international law, something less than national
but more than stateless. This is the status of "refugee." However, to speak
of a refugee status under international law is still somewhat misleading,
because the Convention does not impose any obligation on national sovereigns to recognize such a status within their territorial jurisdictions. Refugees have no right of asylum. Countries can always close their borders
and so find no one within their jurisdiction who fits the definition of a
refugee. 39 Nonetheless, the Convention describes a discrete status which
can be applied to individuals should states agree to do so.
Assuming that a territorial sovereign recognizes an individual as a ref-
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ugee, that person gains certain protections under the Convention. Refugees
enjoy the freedom to practice their religion and to educate their children
after their own fashion to the same extent provided by the sovereign to
its own nationals. 40 The Convention provides that refugees may not be
denied justice by the sovereign of refuge. Refugees are to have free access
to courts of law in all states party to the Convention, 41 and in the state
of the refugee's residence, a refugee shall enjoy such access on the same
terms as do nationals of that country. 42 In other ways the Convention also
provides refugees with protections against abuse of power by the state of
refuge. 43 In a number of provisions the Convention provides for the economic well-being of refugees to prevent them either from being preyed
upon while in the jurisdiction of the state of refuge or from becoming
impoverished dependents in their new residence. 44
While sovereigns of refuge are under no obligation to grant their nationality to refugees, 45 they may expel a refugee from their territory only in
accordance with due process of law and on grounds that the refugee is a
threat to national security or public order. 46 But they may not expel a
refugee or return him or her to a territory where the life or the freedom
of the refugee would be threatened on account of his or her race, religion,
nationality, social group, or political opinion. 47 Countries of refuge may,
however, so place in jeopardy refugees who constitute a danger to such
countries. 48
The Convention thus defines a legal status for refugees to give them
some way to live out their lives as dignified humans in a world parceled
out among sovereign national communities. The Statelessness Convention
provides similar status for dejurestatelesspersons. 49 The status of a refugee
or a de jure stateless person is not that of a national who belongs fully to
one or another of the world's constituent legal units, but rather is that of
a territorial resident who is able to live a private life without participation
in the social contract of the political society of the state in which the person
resides. so This concept of a territorial resident is also a part of the international law of human rights, as discussed in Part IV below; its appearance
in both the law of human rights and the law of refugees and stateless
persons provides the basis for the thesis that international human rights
standards can and should be incorporated into international refugee law.
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PRESENT PROTECTIONS
FOR REFUGEES AND STATELESS PERSONS
Stateless persons, de jure and de facto, and refugees are not well provided for
by the legal mechanisms, discussed in Part II, which were adopted to fill
the lacunae of traditional rules of international law. The conventions
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themselves do not provide either for automatic refuge or permanent resettlement. Situations also arise which the UNHCR and the conventions do
not meet well. UNHCR is underfunded and depends not on international
law but on the compassion of well-to-do nations for its achievements. The
many nations that have not subscribed to either convention deal with
refugees and stateless persons out of political expediency. The refusals of
Malaysia and Singapore to accept Vietnamese boat people for resettlement
are cases in point. 51
Refugees and stateless persons are not given a right of asylum. Sovereign governments may deny access to their territories to aliens who displease them. 5 2 When the Shah of Iran terminated his support for the Kurds
in Iraq in 1976, some 200,000 Kurds fled Iraqi troops by crossing over the
Iranian border. The Shah then returned 40,000 of them to Iraq. 53 Recently
the Bahamas expelled Haitians who had fled there. 54 Hong Kong authorities routinely send back to the People's Republic of China persons seeking
a new life in that tiny crown territory. A right of asylum is not included
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 14 of the Universal
Declaration only gives people the right "to seek" enjoyment of asylum
from persecution. States are not enjoined to provide such enjoyment upon
request. 55 Nor does the 1951 Convention on Refugees contain such a right.
After ten years of effort, a Declaration on Territorial Asylum was adopted
by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 14, 1967.56
As a hortatory document, it too provides no right of asylum.
If persons denied the benefits of group membership by one sovereign
political community cannot place themselves in the territory of any other
sovereign, then the protections offered by a refugee status defined under
international law are illusory. A defined protected status is of little moment
if that status cannot be enjoyed. Refugee law is analogous to the recognition of a right where no remedy is allowed.
Similarly, no one yet has a right to choose a new nationality. Membership in political communities is established for individuals by the ruling
powers who control territory; it is not subject to individual volition. 57
Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights says that while
everyone has "a right to a nationality," states are prevented only from
arbitrarily depriving anyone of his or her nationality and from denying
such person the right to change nationality. The Universal Declaration is
silent on the obligations of states to grant nationality when it is requested.
The Convention on Refugees suggests only that contracting states "facili58
tate" the assimilation and naturalization of refugees "as far as possible."
This is an instruction to be helpful, not a mandate to lite high the lamp
59
beside a Golden Door as the U.S. Statue of Liberty claims to do.
Consequently, both the resettlement of refugees and their adoption of
a new nationality rely upon the good will of the nations of the world to
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accept some aliquot portion of refugee populations as they arise. The good
offices of the UNHCR are most instrumental in eliciting commitments for
resettlement. For Indochinese refugees, the Secretary General of the United
Nations convened a conference in Geneva in the summer of 1979 so that
countries might agree to accept refugees on their soil. 60 A similar conference in 1938 at Evian, France failed to parcel out the Jews of Germany. 61
Denied German citizenship by the Nuremberg Law and unwanted by any
sovereign, they were consigned to a policy of removal from the face of the
earth.
Apart from questions of a right to asylum and a right to a nationality,
international law fails refugees-in the broad sense-and stateless persons
in a third way as well. Protection for refugees and stateless persons is
diminished by restricted definitions of the individuals who may benefit
from refugee or de jure stateless status. This niggardly approach to the
problem of categorization is another defect in the present international
scheme of protection for persons who flee their homelands; a number of
needy cases are simply neglected by the definitions.
The political theory of the sovereign nation-state which evolved in
Western Europe and provided the logic behind the basic principles of
traditional international law 62 permits a distinction to be made between
those categorized as "refugees" and others who flee less obviously politicized disturbances. But persons may lose the protective mantle of nationality for reasons other than the persecution contemplated by the Convention
on Refugees or the de jure loss of nationality required by the Convention
on Stateless Persons. De facto stateless persons who are not refugees under
the relevant convention still have no status. People may flee their native
land because they do not feel they can be full participants in that community. While not the objects of persecution, they may still feel that they
have been denied opportunities for social or economic advancement.
Among these people are Haitians, Mexicans, and Cubans seeking entrance
to the United States, and citizens of the People's Republic of China fleeing
to Hong Kong. 63 These people are not the victims of conscious political
persecution, but of a socioeconomic order. Or, as members of a minority
religious or ethnic group, they may perceive that the government of their
territory will not provide them with a supportive environment. In this
category one can place Palestinians who choose to stay in Lebanese refugee
camps rather than seek a return to land now ruled by Israelis, Afghan
tribesmen in Pakistan, Ogaden Somalis in Somalia (some 848,000 persons
as of October 1980), 64 and Tibetans who fled the Chinese Communist
conquest of Tibet. These people are not necessarily persecuted; they felt
alienated from the ruling class. In both these cases, people seek a better life
for themselves and their children outside their country of origin because
they believe that those with political power in their homelands provide

REFUGEE ENTRY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES

349

there only an uninspiring vision of the future. A third group of persons
who are neither refugees nor de jure stateless persons are those who flee
flood, famine, or war.
Where persecution exists, the intent of a ruling power to deny those in
flight any chance of participation in the political community of their
homeland is clear. The state recognizes no obligation to protect them and
in all likelihood, they have no desire to be loyal to that authority. No basis
for citizenship exists. 65 Continuing to place them in the category of national of that sovereign state makes no sense. They must be given some
alternative status until they become incorporated into the life of a new
sovereign community. People who flee economic destitution, natural
disasters, and conditions of general social disorder have made no such
sharp statement as to their political loyalties. They may indeed contemplate returning home once conditions change; their original sovereign presumably would welcome them back. Accordingly, it is felt with some
justification that these migrants need not be considered "refugees." Indeed,
the Statute of the High Commissioner for Refugees explicitly states that
no one may use reasons of a purely economic character to refuse to avail
oneself of the protection (and the laws, such as they may be) of the country
66
of his or her nationality.
But people flee all the same, and the categories of an international legal
regime seeking protection for all individuals must correspond more than
haphazardly to this reality. Providing a protected status for people who
cannot benefit from any national identification requires above all recognition of the forces that push people into flight and of how those forces are
or are not dealt with in an international order of nation-states.
In this connection, the expanded definition of refugee provided in the
Refugee Convention adopted in 1969 by the Organization of African Unity
is of more than passing interest. 67 In Africa, where sovereign nation-states
bear little relationship to the communities, largely tribes, which engage the
political commitment of most people, the problem of refugees could be
faced more squarely than it could in Western Europe, where the sanctity
of nation-state sovereignties has a stronger tradition. In addition to the
refugees recognized by the 1951 Convention on Refugees, the OAU Convention also considers a "refugee"
every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole
of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of
habitual residence to seek refuge in another place outside his country of
origin or nationality. 68
Refugees and most stateless persons are created when a social contract
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has failed. Typically, after a revolution, a coup d'etat, or a change of
government, certain people may no longer be welcome in the community
fostered by the new rulers. 69 Or economic conditions may have been so
badly mismanaged that people see nothing for themselves in continued
participation in that society.
Floods and famine in nomadic or village societies, where rural people
rarely consider themselves to be members of the national community
promoted by the elite leadership of the land in which they live, have the
same impact on loyalty as government oppression and ineptitude. Such
people may be said never to have joined the national community. Without
a developed economy to provide the means for rapid recovery, people may
prefer to move with their relatives and neighbors to avoid the conditions
following upon natural or other disasters and find new circumstances more
sustaining of life, liberty, and personal property without regard for national boundaries. The tie of nationality, so important in international law, has
little, if any, meaning in their lives. They stand outside the social contracts
supporting the sovereigns of the world.
Breakdown of law and order, through declared war, insurrection,
anarchy, or institutionalized arbitrary oppression, also destroys the social
contract. If the power of the collective cannot provide even a modicum of
personal security, people have little interest in sticking around. The government has failed to meet its obligations. Pufendorf argued that sovereignty was conferred only to secure the common weal; thus, a person may
leave a state if its administration has little value for his or her private
interests. The safety of the people should be the supreme law. Consequently, when sovereignty fails, it may be renounced. 70 Uganda under Idi
Amin, Lebanon before the Syrian intervention of 1977, East Pakistan just
prior to the establishment of Bangladesh, and El Salvador torn between
armed extremists, all provide examples of such circumstances wherein
people pick up what they can carry and flee. 71
Refugees and stateless persons exist in the interstices between sovereign
nation-states because they are products of the breakdown of a nation-state
as a sustaining political community. Where nation-states provide full community, there are few refugees or stateless persons in flight. But when
community fails, the state as a legal entity remains only as a structure of
officials and armed might, not as an object of loyalty and legitimate authority. As far as those who flee are concerned, there is still a state but no
nation. The state may remain vital in the eyes of international law, but
such sovereign authority and such power do not constitute a commonwealth in which the refugees or stateless persons can enjoy the benefits of
membership. Unable to receive its benefits, they should not be forced by
international law to retain their nationality and so suffer whatever that
state considers to be their just desserts.
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The current regime for refugees and stateless persons under international law provides only a partial solution for the problem, and lurches from
crisis to crisis primarily as the compassion of the liberal bourgeois democracies provides funds and homes for those in need.

REFUGEES AND STATELESS PERSONS
UNDER A HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME
If the problem posed by refugees and stateless persons is how individuals cut off from the tie of nationality, which would normally protect them
under international law, may be protected from deprivations imposed by
sovereign powers, then a solution lies in the rules that extract from governments some solicitude for individuals, regardless of race, creed, sex, national origin, social class, or political coloration. The emerging law of
international human rights does just that. The injunctions of the relevant
human rights instruments speak not of citizens or of nationals but of
individuals. States are enjoined by human rights standards as to their use
of the police power. The injunction runs to wherever in their territory they
may use such power, embracing all subject to that power, regardless of
nationality. Individuals found within the state's territory may base their
claim for protection on their humanity and nothing more. This is but a
rebirth of the Roman jus genhium, which, in the interest of continued commercial intercourse with foreigners, gave aliens civil and economic rights.
The jurisprudential basis for such rights lies more in the capacity of the
individual person to deal fairly with other men and women than in the
quasi-contractual obligations arising from adherence to a special political

community. 72
The preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights posits the
underlying premise of that Declaration as to the nature of sovereign authority: such authority must not be despotic. According to the preamble,
"it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last
resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights
should be protected by the rule of law." 73 The ideal of the rule of law is
that government is an office, which must not be abused, to promote the
common well-being of those dependent upon its power. 74 Exclusionary,
overbearing arrogance in authority (whether of a man, a faction, a party,
or even of the majority) is contrary to the rule of law. Governments that
adhere to the rule of law leave room for compromise and tolerance in their
societies, social and political spaces where individual opportunity can exist. In providing protection for individuals, such governments always
uphold their part of the social contract supporting citizenship, that reciprocal exchange of loyalty for succor.
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But according to the Universal Declaration, the obligations of governments under the rule of law run to all people within their territories, not
to citizens alone.75 Article 2 of the Universal Declaration boldly states that
"everyone" is entitled to the rights and freedoms listed in the other articles.
In particular, no distinction is to be made among people due to their
"national or social origin." Further, the status of the sovereign authority
of the country or territory to which a person belongs is irrelevant to an
individual's claim for enjoyment of human rights. Those who rule nonself-governing states or trust territories must still recognize the applicability of human rights in their domains. This second paragraph in Article 2
of the Universal Declaration merely confirms the principle of the first
paragraph that individuals, regardless of national status, are to benefit
from the rights and freedoms enumerated therein. 76 Human rights adhere
to individuals; they are not derived from national status. Vattel thought
that exile and banishment do not take away from man his human personality, nor his right to live somewhere or other. 77 The International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the European Convention on Human Rights,
and the American Convention on Human Rights do not discriminate between nationals and aliens with regard to basic rights. 7 The preamble to
the American Convention even goes so far as to say that "the essential
rights of man are not derived from one's being a national of a certain state,
79
but are based upon attributes of the human personality."'
The Universal Declaration reserves for nationals of a given country only
three of the claims considered as "human rights." Article 21 provides that
only nationals have the right to take part in the government of their
country and that the right of equal access to public service applies only to
people in their capacity as nationals of a given country. Article 13(a)
reserves the right to return to a country only to nationals thereof. The
remaining rights listed in the Universal Declaration, then, can be taken to
define a status of territorial resident applicable to citizens and noncitizens
alike, the latter category including aliens, refugees, and stateless persons.
The status created by the Universal Declaration has three principal
aspects. First, the state may not abuse any individual and may not deny
him or her access to the courts. 8o Second, individuals may surround themselves with intellectual, emotional, and physical privacy free from arbitrary interference by the state. 81 Part of this sphere of privacy consists of
freedom of thought, conscience, religion, opinion, and expression. The
"nuclear family" is also protected with provisions for freedom of marriage.
Third, the Universal Declaration provides in several articles for the economic and social advancement of individuals. 82 These articles provide for
the ownership of property, social security, employment opportunities,
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food, clothing, housing, medical attention, and education. The Universal
Declaration thus holds out the possibility of a dignified and rewarding life
for individuals even though they may not participate as nationals in the
political process of their country of residence.
The two international covenants on individual rights proposed after the
Universal Declaration was adopted do not significantly detract from the
status of territorial resident there provided. Article 2 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights commits each signatory state to
ensure the rights enumerated in the covenant to "all individuals within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction." 8 3 However, Article 4 permits
states, consistent with their other obligations under international law, to
derogate from their obligations under the covenant in times of emergency
threatening the nation's life. But provisions relating to protection from
and
cruel and abusive police actions and freedom of thought, conscience,
84
religion are immune from derogation even in those circumstances.
In general, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
provides for the first two aspects of territorial resident status-protection
from abusive state action and a sphere of personal privacy. Articles 9, 10,
and 11 limit the powers of arrest and incarceration. Article 14 provides for
fair and public trials while Article 16 provides for recognition before the
law. Article 15, a prohibition of ex post facto convictions, limits the grounds
on which persons can be convicted. Article 7 prohibits torture and inhumane punishment and Article 10(3) stipulates humane treatment of those
deprived of their liberty. Articles 17, 18, and 19 provide for personal
privacy and the attendant rights of free thought and opinion. Article 23
protects the family unit. Articles 24 on children and 27 on ethnic, religious,
or linguistic minorities add specific protections for those classes of people
which do not appear in the more general provisions of the Universal
Declaration. Finally, Article 25 reserves explicitly for citizens the right and
opportunity to participate in public affairs, including public service. This
last article shows inferentially that the other rights of the Covenant may
be enjoyed by noncitizens, the point made by Article 2(1).
85
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
provides for the third aspect of territorial resident status, the economic and
social advancement of individuals. Articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant establish a right to support oneself through freely chosen work. Article 9 provides for social security for everyone. Article 11 states that people have a
right to food, clothing, and shelter, and to an improvement in their living
conditions. Article 12 puts forth a right to health while Article 13 provides
a right to education, including private education. 86
Should sovereign powers receive stateless persons and then treat them
as the international human rights instruments insist that all territorial
residents be treated, then stateless people, impelled by a variety of circum-
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stances, will receive adequate protection under international law. Once
people come under the authority of a state, human rights law covers them
with the status of territorial resident. Unfortunately, the international law
on human rights does not bear on the most important opportunity for a
refugee or stateless person: obtaining access to a land of refuge. Human
rights law speaks to the treatment of people within a jurisdiction but not
to their ease of entry. The drafters of the Universal Declaration consciously
refused to adopt asylum as a universal human right when such a right was
proposed. 87 Under current law, therefore, the most serious obstacle confronting stateless persons seeking a measure of protection is entry into a
sovereign's jurisdiction. Only a right of asylum need be added to the
human rights conventions for this obstacle to be removed.
The implicit premise of international human rights law is that governments are limited in their use of their authority. A doctrine of constitutionalism is implied by the rules of international law which define the
legitimate use of sovereignty vis-4-vis human beings. Recognition of human
rights, a natural law concept, calls for governments to act as if they are
parties to a conditional social contract. Something more than maintenance
of minimal law and order is necessary for a social contract to be binding.
If that low threshold of order were the sole precondition for legitimacy,
civilized political communities would be reduced to the anarchy and oppression of warlord ambitions. States must provide for personal felicity in
addition to security and order as the conditions for holding power. In this
sense, governments must obey a norm other than their own will. They
must accept limits to their power, the substance of constitutionalism. 8 8 In
such a world one could expect a reduction in refugee movements.
Another aspect of international law, the law of war, also limits the
prerogative of sovereign states in the use of force. Even in war, governments must control their actions out of regard for human life, the same
concern underlying recognition of human rights. Again a principle akin to
constitutionalism is implicit in the legal regime within which sovereign
states act. This law of war reinforces the need to emphasize a state's
obligations to respect those under its authority. Prisoners of war, those
who minister to the armed forces (medics and chaplains, for example) and
civilians not engaged in the conflict are protected by the law of war. 89
Article 3 of each of the four conventions on warfare adopted at a conference in Geneva in 1949 attempts to protect noncombatant civilians in
armed conflicts not of an international character. In particular, acts of
violence against and degrading treatment of such persons is prohibited. 90
Efforts have been made to prohibit use of certain weapons by armed forces,
which legal limits inhibit their military efficiency. For example, expanding
bullets and asphyxiating or poisonous gases have been proscribed. 91
The Fourth Geneva Convention, interestingly enough, provides some
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protection for persons resident in territory seized by a belligerent power.
People caught in the vortex of war are rather like refugees in that political
community has failed for them. International law attempts to give them
protection against the power which rules over their lives and property. 92
Thus the law of war has its own analog to the status of territorial resident.
The status of territorial resident provided by human rights documents
is not one of license. The Universal Declaration says in Article 29(1) that
everyone has duties to his or her community. The rights and freedoms of
others must be respected by individuals, and the just requirements of
morality, public order, and the general welfare must be met. There is, then,
a reciprocal aspect to being a territorial resident. Refugees and stateless
persons are already under such an obligation: Article 2 of the Convention
on Refugees and Article 2 of the 1954 Convention on Stateless Persons
both prescribe duties of individuals under the protection of those covenants to obey the laws, regulations, and measures taken to maintain the
public order of countries of refuge.
The application of human rights standards to all refugees and stateless
persons, once they arrive within a sovereign jurisdiction, would give them
a status of territorial resident, something less than the status of a national
but similar to that now provided for limited classes of refugees and de jure
stateless persons. With use of human rights standards, definitions of who
is and who is not a refugee or a stateless person fade away in importance.
All people on the territory, without regard for nationality, deserve protection and opportunities to support themselves and their children. A state
may still refuse entrance under human rights law, but those who become
subject to its jurisdiction gain a measure of consideration. 93 Once resident,
a person should not be subject to exile or banishment except for legal
cause. Under a territorial scheme of sovereignty considered as a public
trust, individuals, as Cicero said, "ought to be able to retain or renounce
94
[their] rights of membership of a society."
The application of human rights standards to the problem of refugees
does require a shift in the conception of the nation-state. It appears in the
new perspective less a self-selected community of citizens, sharing a common subjective corporate sentiment, and more a custodian of territory and
all the people therein. The United Nation's Covention on the Reduction
of Statelessness takes a position that sovereigns must be responsible to all
their territorial subjects because it forbids them to deprive anyone of
nationality on the grounds of race, ethnicity, religion or political opinion. 95 The conception of the state more as a territorial power and less as
a moral community of citizens is most appropriate for international law in
any case, because such law has as its concern the effect on other territorial
rulers of actions of territorial powers vis-d-vis events occurring in their
territory; international law is not concerned with the internal decision-
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making structure of the different sovereigns. 96 States were to protect the
subjects of other states because injury to such persons was a wrong to the
foreign sovereign. Territorial events which caused such injuries were of
international legal significance because they had an extraterritorial impact,
not because they had implications for the distribution of public authority
in the jurisdiction where the injury occurred.
Under a territorial scheme, within each state there would be two classes
of persons-citizens and territorial residents. 97 Such a class division is not
objectionable as a denial of equal protection. For example, the immigration
laws of the United States provide that immigrants must spend five years
as permanent residents before they become citizens. As permanent residents, they are denied certain rights of public employment, jury duty,
voting, and other aspects of political life open to citizens. 98 As Aristotle
wrote, a citizen is one "who has the power to take part in the deliberative
or judicial administration" of the state. 99 The American doctrine of equal
protection provides that distinctions among classes of people can be sustained if they reflect rational pursuit of some suitable government objective. 100 The distinction between citizen and resident reflects the objective
of motivating citizens to acquire the interest, outlook, and commitment
necessary to make the nation's political process work. A period of residence (one could quibble over whether five years is correct in all cases)
before acquiring the status of citizen may well increase the likelihood of
more effective political participation by the newcomer. It is not inappropriate to ask that those given political power feel within themselves a commitment to the community around them. That is only another way of
increasing their fiduciary sensitivities to the exercise of that power which
can indeed have an impact upon the lives of their friends and neighbors.
Length of residence may correlate well with the development of such
personal involvement in a surrounding community. It is a permissible basis
on which to distinguish citizens from other residents. 101
To treat residents differently from citizens is not necessarily to stigmatize them, the evil to be avoided by the application of the concept of equal
protection of the laws. 102 Residents under human rights law should be the
equal of citizens in all important respects regarding individual autonomy
and dignity. Respect for each individual's basic humanity is contained in
fidelity to human rights norms, not in a concept of nationality or citizenship.
As far as refugees and stateless persons are concerned, the gap between
territorial residency and citizenship is properly overcome with time. Second and third generation immigrants, not the new arrivals, most need
citizenship. Furthermore, the recently arrived would not need access to the
political process once their rights as residents are protected. Opening naturalization procedures to those born in the territory would not subject
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nation-states to automatic diminution of their political autonomy under
alien influence as would an insistence that all who reach a territory must
become its citizens in order to avoid inequalities between citizens and
residents. 103 Sudden intrusions of refugees who then immediately acquired citizenship would also frustrate the expectations for their society
of those already living in the territory and shaping its communal life,
leading to friction and unrest. Resentment of refugees even as temporary
residents is already serious in many cases.
The possible relationships between individuals and sovereign authorities already comprise a continuum of reciprocal needs ranging from a
seaman in port for a few days to the protected citizen or perhaps a privileged elite. Each circumstance places the individual in a discrete relationship with the ruling authorities. In the middle come tourists, traveling
businessmen, refugees, alien residents, and less-favored subjects. Tourists
do not need the economic assurances of citizens, for example. Foreign
businessmen need not expect to benefit from monopoly protections given
to promote domestic industry. (Sometimes it is the foreigners who benefit
from special economic legislation-tax holidays-to the detriment of nationals.) In short, the tie between a sovereign and an individual (nationality) should be less important than packages of reciprocal rights and
obligations defined for different kinds of relationships. The status of territorial resident under human rights norms is one such package.
Defining a status of territorial resident as one point on the continuum
to protect, inter alia,refugees and stateless persons, would not interfere with
the current framework of international law regulating intercourse between
individuals and governments. The status of territorial resident could even
replace the current use of refugee, de jure stateless, and de facto stateless
statuses to simplify the rights of persons in flight from their homeland. In
making this change with regard to refugees, however, care must be taken
to ensure preservation of the refugee's protection against refoulement--an
issue arising as a result of border-crossing which, like asylum, is not
04
directly addressed by human rights standards. 1
The General Assembly of the United Nations has already recognized the
relevance of human rights norms for persons in flight. On December 6,
1968, the General Assembly urged members of the United Nations to
improve "the legal status of refugees residing in their territory" by treating
refugee situations in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. ' 0 5
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IMPLEMENTATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS
FOR REFUGEES AND STATELESS PERSONS:
SUING THE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
To say that relevant statements of human rights standards under international law define a status of territorial resident which includes persons in
flight from their homelands only states a possibility implicit in the law but
not yet realized in practice. Human rights standards now bind governments only loosely; individual access to courts for enforcement of such
standards is problematic in most nations. Changing the legal argument as
to the nature and scope of their obligations will not significantly facilitate
a generous response of governments-whether of origin or of refuge-to
refugee populations.
The major obstacle preventing acceptance of human rights standards for
refugees and stateless persons lies in the same conditions which limit
responses to their plight at present. The burden of providing for refugees
falls on those who receive them, not on the governments which generate
them. There are no sanctions placed on regimes that ostracize large numbers of their would-be nationals or that are so remiss in management of
domestic affairs that people leave to seek better lives elsewhere. Those
most able to prevent refugee movements are given no incentive to do so.
Here again, human rights standards can play a helpful role. They provide norms which are violated when refugees or stateless persons are
created. Violation, either intentional or through negligence, provides justification for the imposition of sanctions on the violators. The principle at
work should be analogized more to the law of torts than to criminal
prosecutions. The purpose of imposing sanctions would be to place responsibility for avoiding harmful actions on those most capable of preventing the harm. To achieve this end, human rights standards can be seen
as setting up a duty of due care, placing governments on notice as to the
scope of their responsibility. Failure to meet the standard would lead to
sanctions when other states suffer as a consequence.
Refugees are prima facie evidence that there has been a failure of human
rights protections in their homeland. 106 One thinks of Jews in Germany
and, later, Cambodians in Thailand escaping Pol Pot. Wherever there is
persecution on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
social group, or political opinion, there has been a denial of civil and
political rights. 107 One could leave the conclusion as to violation of human
rights by home governments in refugee situations to a case-by-case determination. Persons seeking refuge could allege that the reason for abandonment of their homeland was denial of specific human rights there. A
finding that they had been so denied would lay the proper jurisprudential
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foundation for seeking sanctions against that sovereign power once a proper forum is found.
The situation with respect to violation of economic and social rights in
the country of origin is less obvious. Rights enunciated in the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights are to be provided by
states without discrimination as to "race, color, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status." 108 But if people leave their homeland, not from concern over
discriminatory exclusion from social and economic advantages, but from
a perception that the government's and the society's incompetence, lassitude, or corruption foreclose opportunity for personal advancement, the
government's breach of its international obligations is less clear. Article 2
commits states to the maximum use of their available resources for the full
realization in progressive stages of the rights recognized by the Convention. A judicial test of this commitment would involve an objective determination of whether a state provides economic rights to everyone within
its jurisdiction-including displaced persons-to the maximum use of
available"resources. The province of judges is peculiarly that of categorizing government actions as falling within or without certain established
conceptual parameters. In a proper forum, the actions of a government
generating economic refugees could be examined and evaluated for compliance with the standard of Article 2. Should the government be found
wanting, a violation of economic or social human rights would have been
found.
Violations of human rights standards when refugees or stateless persons
are generated produce two kinds of injuries. First, individuals forced from
their homelands suffer economic and moral damage. Second, economic and
political burdens fall on the state of refuge and resettlement. It would not
seem out of course to permit states aggrieved by refugee influxes to seek
recovery of the unsolicited budgetary expenses that they have incurred in
responding to such incursions from the state that gave rise to the exodus.
The aggrieved state of refuge could simply proceed against the assets of
the offending state wherever suits may be brought before a court competent to adjudicate interstate claims. Less possible under current international practice but no less just would be an individual right of action by
refugees against their former sovereigns for intentional or negligent infliction of injury done in the acts driving them to find refuge in an alien
land. 109 This right would arise under the domestic law of the sovereign of
refuge or under international law, either of which courts could recognize.
Damages awarded to the individual plaintiff would come most easily out
of assets belonging to commercial activities of the offending sovereign.
The suggestion that foreign sovereigns be brought before the bar of
justice in a jurisdiction of refugee resettlement seems to run counter to the
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doctrines of sovereign immunity and of deference to acts of state. These
doctrines were derived by courts, at least in the United States, as selfimposed limitations on their adjudicatory competence. Under sovereign
immunity, a foreign sovereign acting as such is considered beyond the
reach of a court's jurisdiction. 110 Under the act of state doctrine, a court
refrains from examining the validity of a dispositive action of a foreign
government carried out within its own territory, when the act is an issue
in a suit in a U.S. court. " On close analysis, neither doctrine presents
insurmountable obstacles to the course here proposed. The dangers that
each doctrine seeks to avoid are not necessarily present in the refugee
situation; in those circumstances in which the dangers exist, the doctrines
would apply as usual.
Justice Frankfurter, in National Bank v. Republic of China,112 pointed to the
policy behind both doctrines when he spoke of judicial restraint arising out
of a desire for fair dealing, a recognition of reciprocal self-interest, and the
good will to respect the power and dignity of another sovereign. If the
foreign sovereign itself ignores the restraints of fair dealing, imposes undue
burdens on its peers and has no respect for the position of its neighbor,
it should no longer benefit from the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the
courts of a nation which it has aggrieved: 113 the reason for the rule having
ceased to apply, the rule itself should be of no effect. 114 Nations that do
not deal fairly with the United States--or any other country of refugeshould lose their claim to judicial solicitude. 115
One might object that when relations between sovereigns become testy,
the courts should not interfere in such matters and should leave the resolution of international disputes to the executive power. This principle of
judicial self-restraint has been prominently articulated in the cases applying the act of state doctrine. In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, Justice
Harlan feared that amicable relations between states would be imperiled
if courts passed on the validity of actions taken by foreign governments. 116 Yet as the earlier case of Bernstein v. N. V Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart Naatschappij suggests, there is an alternative to judicial
quiescence. 117 The executive can exercise its own restraint in foreign
affairs, deferring consideration of rights to judicial resolution. This would
embolden the courts to tread in international waters. Regarding refugees,
governments could announce their intention to leave the matter of violation of human rights and the seeking of damages therefore to their domestic courts. Foreign sovereigns would then be on notice that they would
have no shield of sovereign immunity or deference to acts of state to
protect them from the consequences of internationally unlawful behavior
which generates refugees.
Some courts have characterized the act of state doctrine as an aspect of
choice of law, the foreign law being held dispositive in the case at issue. 118
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Under this view, whatever rights may be asserted in the proceeding are
determined by the foreign state's law; judicial scrutiny is thus inappropriate, the sovereign being presumed to have acted in accordance with-or to
have made-its own law. The suggestion that human rights standards be
used in refugee situations poses a different choice of law problem, eliminating this use of the act of state doctrine. The relevant law for such cases
can be considered either international law or the domestic law of the forum
which adopts human rights standards. In Sabbatino, while the court did not
apply international law to the nationalization of property in dispute, it did
not forbid application of such law in the future. The court noted rather that
international law on the subject of nationalization of property was unclear,
or worse, was in a state of flux. 119 There was no rule to be applied. Much
earlier, in Rose v. Himely where Justice Marshall found a clear rule of international law, he had no difficulty applying it to invalidate the authority of
a foreign tribunal. 120 Today in the normal case, U.S. courts are bound by
the law of nations which is part of the law of the land. 121
Where human rights are concerned, standards of sufficient precision
have won widespread approval. They can serve as rules of law cognizeable
in domestic courts. The concern in Sabbatinothat the law is unclear does not
arise where human rights standards are presented. The Second Circuit, for
example, recently found that "deliberate torture perpetrated under color
of official authority violates universally accepted norms of the international law of human rights." 12 2 And in an even more recent case, Judge Rogers
of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas held that the
international law of human rights obligated the United States to release
from detention in Leavenworth Prison a Cuban national being held pending deportation. 123 Pedro Fernandez had been allowed into the United
States on a temporary basis so his claim for admission could be considered
at greater leisure. Subsequently, on the basis of his record of criminal
convictions in Cuba, he was denied permission to enter the country permanently. He was remanded to Leavenworth Prison to be held in custody
until his departure could be arranged. In the eyes of the law, he had never
entered the United States: his status was still that of an alien seeking
admission to our territory. In legal theory Fernandez was outside the jurisdiction of the United States and neither the Constitution nor congressional
statutes protected him from incarceration sine die by the federal authorities.
However, under international law he had a right to be free of arbitrary
detention. Since no limit had been set for his detention, the court found
that the federal government had denied his freedom arbitrarily, in viola24
tion of international law. 1
International human rights standards are widely known, even if not
universally applied. Foreign governments cannot plead unfairness because
of inadequate notice when subjected to such standards. While ideological
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goals may be at stake in the creation of refugee populations, the validity
of these goals ceases when human rights are violated. Such wrongs are fit
subjects for the application of judicial power.
Suits against sovereigns for human rights violations which injure the
forum state differ in another way from most previous cases applying either
the doctrine of sovereign immunity or the doctrine of deference to acts of
state. Those cases frequently considered the effect of a foreign act consummated within the foreign sovereign's own territory, such as a decision as
to title made and perfected within the foreign jurisdiction. The foreign
sovereign in such cases acts without intending to disturb the public life of
the forum. But where the change in rights has not been perfected within
the jurisdiction of the foreign state because, for example, the purportedly
affected property was in the United States, then U.S. courts have denied
the effect of the foreign decision. 125 When citizens are denied the benefits
of nationality and forced to flee, complications for other states are to be
expected. The effects of refugee generation cannot be contained within the
jurisdiction of the state whose actions gave rise to the problem. Since the
direct and immediate consequences set in motion by the policy creating
refugees (once again a tort concept is relevant) do not end within the
originating jurisdiction, that jurisdiction has no claim to special deference
by the courts of the countries of refuge. 126 Those injured by the "pushing"
state may obtain justice through the use of any law at their disposal.
Finally, for a forum court in a country of refuge to recognize as valid
the laws and policies which drove refugees from their homes would be to
give effect to punitive public laws of another state-a recognition due to
no state. 127 Allowing foreign states to escape the consequences of their
detrimental policies in a domestic forum would vindicate unnecessarily
their public law. 128

CONCLUSION
The preceding discussion is not by any means offered as an exhaustive
treatment of the problems of nations and refugees, or the claims and
forums involved in the application of international human rights law.
What is clear is that traditional doctrines of sovereign immunity and
deference to acts of state do not preclude immediate judicial application
of human rights standards to refugees; the complicated issues raised above
may be addressed within the context of current rules of international law.
While undoubtedly crucial in bringing about the implementation of policies yet dormant in international law, these issues are, nevertheless, details,
and the focus of all of the foregoing has been on the broader policies and
principles. The main points are these: (1) principles exist within interna-
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tional law that justify the application of human rights standards to ref-

ugees and stateless persons and (2) rights of action and forums can be
found to permit application of those standards in individual cases. It is in
the self-interest of the more decent and compassionate nations of the
world to see that the possibilities suggested here become living components of international practice.
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